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CLASHING POLICIES OR CONFUSING PRECEDENTS:
THE “GROSS NEGLIGENCE” EXCEPTION TO
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES DISCLAIMERS
MICHAEL PILLOW
ABSTRACT
Consequential damages can easily amount to millions of dollars.
Commercial parties often disclaim consequential damages in their contracts. This Article posits that such disclaimers between commercial parties
under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) should not be found unenforceable based on gross negligence. Article 2 of the UCC promotes the
policy of freedom of contract. Consistent with that policy, section 2-719 of
the UCC provides that contractual consequential damages disclaimers
should be enforceable absent a finding of unconscionability. This Article
analyzes the interplay among UCC section 2-719, “public policy” exceptions
to enforcing limitations of liability, and the law of gross negligence. This
Article concludes that but for those rare circumstances in which a commercial buyer may invoke unconscionability, courts should uphold consequential damages disclaimers absent a clear showing of willful misconduct. This
standard provides a more discernible “bright-line” that comports with the
general treatment of economic losses under the UCC.
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INTRODUCTION
There are several points that have attained clarity regarding the enforceability of limitations of liability under the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC). Most importantly, agreed risk allocations under section 2-719 between sophisticated business entities are generally upheld. One notable
exception to this point stems from “public policy” considerations, essentially arising from a seller’s alleged willful misconduct, gross negligence,
or similar wrongful acts.1 A second clear point is that courts may apply the
unconscionability doctrine to overturn grossly unfair contract terms, including consequential damages disclaimers or other liability limitations.2
This doctrine is largely restricted to the consumer or unsophisticated buyer
context. A third point attaining clarity is that case decisions dealing specifically with sales of goods under Article 2 differ only somewhat from cases
applying the common law.
At least two points remain unsettled. A split of authority still exists regarding whether a limited remedy that “fails of its essential purpose” also
invalidates a consequential damages disclaimer or other monetary limitation on damages.3 Further, this Article posits that court decisions reflect
dissonance, if not outright confusion, on what types of “bad acts” can negate an otherwise valid limitation on public policy grounds. One principal
problem concerns the legal line of demarcation between gross negligence
and intentional misconduct. Some courts use gross negligence or any conduct greater than ordinary negligence.4 Others employ such terms as recklessness, reckless disregard, or bad faith.5
Refusing to enforce commercial limitations of liability based on a nebulous concept of gross negligence clearly appears to conflict with the ascendant policy of freedom of contract.6 Such refusals are also inconsistent with
both the text and purpose of section 2-719 and associated UCC provisions.7
This Article explores the primary impediments to enforcing a seller’s
contractual limitations of liability in the commercial setting. It focuses on
consequential damage disclaimers under the UCC. This Article suggests
1

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1979).
See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012).
3
See Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1314 (9th Cir. 1984).
4
See NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1546 (N.D. Okla. 1997).
5
See Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 723 A.2d 454, 462 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1998).
6
See Colnaghi, U.S.A., Ltd. v. Jewelers Prot. Servs., Ltd., 611 N.E.2d 282, 283–84
(N.Y. 1993).
7
See U.C.C. § 2-719.
2
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that, except in those rare circumstances in which a buyer may invoke unconscionability, courts should uphold consequential damages disclaimers
per the contract terms, absent a clear showing of willful misconduct, that
is, intentional “bad acts” by the seller. This standard provides a much
more discernible “bright-line” test for courts to apply. Numerous federal
and state cases demonstrate beyond cavil that the law affords no consistent
conception of gross negligence.8 Unenforceability based on gross negligence also runs counter to established precedents limiting recovery of
economic losses in tort. The analysis recommended here also accords with
the better-reasoned cases’ conclusion that a failure of essential purpose does
not automatically invalidate a consequential damages disclaimer.
To illustrate the importance of this issue, imagine the following realistic scenario. Two large, sophisticated companies negotiate a multimilliondollar contract for supplying complex equipment and ancillary installation
services.9 The contract includes a limitation of liability consistent with the
particular industry’s standards. During negotiations, the buyer seeks to include an exclusion or exception to the limitation for any situation involving
the seller’s gross negligence. Seller begrudgingly assents only if the parties
could agree on a definition for gross negligence. The seller’s counsel drafts
a definition essentially requiring “intentional” acts, which the buyer declines. Ultimately, the parties consciously leave out any reference regarding gross negligence in the liability limitation. During the course of seller’s performance, the seller’s product malfunctions numerous times. The
seller responds to buyer’s warranty claims, and is finally able to make the
product work after many months and several repairs. Meanwhile, the buyer suffers lost profits, business interruption, and other economic losses far
exceeding the contract price. It seeks to avoid all limitations, particularly
the consequential damages disclaimers, based on seller’s gross negligence
in manufacturing and equipment installation. Under current law in most
United States jurisdictions, the buyer might prevail.
I. LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY UNDER THE UCC
UCC section 2-719 expressly allows parties to agree on contractual limitations to the remedies otherwise afforded to the parties under the respective
8

See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 72 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Contracts involving both goods and services are considered “hybrid” contracts that
are analyzed as to whether the UCC applies under either the “predominant purpose” test
(majority rule) or the “gravamen of the action” test (minority approach). See JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES OF SALES LAW § 2-1, at 32–33 (2009)
[hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES].
9
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UCC provisions.10 Such limitations can take various forms, including use of
liquidated damages in certain instances.11 Probably the two most common
means for a seller to limit its liability in commercial contracts consist of
limitations on the total amount of recoverable damages (commonly referred
to as “caps”) and “consequential damages disclaimers.”12 A somewhat simplified sample limitation may be drafted along the following lines:
Seller is not liable to Buyer, whether as a result of breach of
contract, warranty, indemnity, tort (including negligence),
strict liability or otherwise for
(a) lost profits or revenues, business loss or interruption, claims
of Buyer’s customers, or for any special, consequential, incidental, indirect or punitive damages, or
(b) any amounts in excess of the contract price paid to Seller.
The foregoing limitations of liability do not apply in the case
of liabilities arising from Seller’s willful misconduct or fraud.
A few points about this language should be noted. First, the limitation
attempts to shield the Seller from liability under some specific legal bases
10

U.C.C. § 2-719 provides as follows:
§ 2-719. Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy.
Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of
the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages, the
agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for
those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of
damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer’s remedies
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and
replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and resort to a remedy as
provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive,
in which case it is the sole remedy.
Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury
to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable
but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012).
11
See id.
12
See id. Liability limits are much more relevant to a seller. First, sellers cannot normally
seek consequential damages under section 2-715. WHITE & SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES, supra
note 9, § 8-16, at 457. Second, a buyer’s “performance” will primarily consist of payment.
Buyers may sometimes have additional obligations, such as transportation of goods,
providing access to their factory or affording certain technical assistance. In these instances,
buyers may seek “reciprocal” limitations of liability. These pose additional challenges,
since they could be applied to the payment obligations as well.

498

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:493

as well as “otherwise.” The latter term may serve as shorthand for “any
other legal theory.” Courts tend to interpret limitations of liability strictly,
and at least require that the limiting language cover the specific claims
raised in a lawsuit brought by a disgruntled buyer.13 For example, to enhance enforceability, if a buyer sues based on a negligence theory, a seller’s limitation should contain that word in the disclaimer.
Second, the disclaimer mentions specific categories of damages (typically those relevant to the particular product, contract, or industry) along
with general categories. Fundamentally, the disclaimer intends to restrict a
buyer to what one may consider “direct” damages. It also covers more than
“consequential” damages. General damages terms may be interpreted in
various ways. For example, the dividing line between “incidental” and
“consequential” is not always clear.14 Even “lost profits” may be considered
“direct” rather than “consequential” in certain circumstances.15
Third, the limitation of liability carves out fraud and willful misconduct. Such actions by a seller may render the limitation unenforceable in
court as discussed below.16 Sellers and their counsel perhaps reasonably
conclude that a court will more likely enforce the limitation if such recognized exceptions have been explicitly accepted.
A buyer challenging a consequential damages disclaimer must first establish that consequential damages may be claimed.17 Although the UCC
uses different language for consequential damages than the basic common
law “foreseeability” test, courts have generally employed the familiar test
under the Code nonetheless.18 In the large majority of business disputes
13

See, e.g., New Light Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 525 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Neb. 1994);
Great N. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 723, 752 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
14
See Firwood Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 96 F.3d 163, 173 (6th Cir. 1996) (interest charges).
15
See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-2,
at 375–76 (5th ed. 2006); Penncro Assocs., Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 499 F.3d 1151,
1156 (10th Cir. 2007). The Penncro court cited an example of a services contract where a
party expected a profit as part of the benefit of its bargain. Id. One may also consider
breaches of confidentiality or intellectual property agreements as involving more direct
claims for lost profits.
16
See infra notes 53–71 and accompanying text.
17
See Thomas Diamond & Howard Foss, Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss:
An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 665, 667–69 (1994).
18
See id. at 670–71. The authors of Consequential Damages Alternative address concerns with the ambiguous and inflexible standard of Hadley v. Baxendale. They propose a
trifurcated approach to consequential damages claims, taking into account various policy
considerations and the level of a seller’s knowledge of the consequences of breach. This
would serve as a “default” approach when the parties have not contractually allocated the
risk of consequential damages. Hence, their recommendations do not seem inconsistent
with the primary tenets of this Article.
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between sophisticated entities, a buyer should readily overcome this initial
hurdle inasmuch as a seller would presumably recognize such implications
of a breach.
A buyer may then dispute a limitation on the basis that it is unconscionable. Under UCC section 2-719, “[c]onsequential damages may be limited
or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.”19 Unconscionability is measured at the time of contracting under section 2-302.20
As one commentator has suggested, “[a] principled application of unconscionability must strike a balance between the need for fairness and the need
for certainty.”21 The most widely accepted test for unconscionability involves both procedural and substantive aspects: “an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”22
Sample language along the lines shown above may exist in a seller’s
standard terms or may result from negotiations. Unquestionably, a seller
stands a better chance at enforcing negotiated terms rather than boilerplate
terms, even putting aside battle of forms scenarios.23 With standard terms,
a buyer may concoct stronger arguments based on lack of meaningful
choice and unreasonable contract terms. In commercial cases, this doctrine
has been applied sparingly as courts rationalize that parties have relatively
equal bargaining power.24
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
(PSNH) exemplifies the courts’ reluctance to find limitations of liability
unconscionable in a commercial setting.25 In PSNH, the buyer asserted that
“standard” contractual limitations were unconscionable because such terms
were “forced” on it due to disparity in bargaining positions, owed in part to
the “duopolistic” nature of the industry at that time.26 The federal district
court rejected this contention, initially questioning the doctrine’s applicability in a commercial contract involving millions of dollars.27 It indicated that
19

U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012).
Id. § 2-302.
21
Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 SW. L.J. 1065,
1085 (1986).
22
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23
See Jonathan A. Eddy, On the “Essential” Purposes of Limited Remedies: The
Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 28, 80 n.179 (1977).
24
See, e.g., K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 263 A.2d 390, 393 (Pa. 1970);
WHITE & SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 13-11, at 710.
25
Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 1281, 1288–89
(D.N.H. 1988).
26
Id. at 1288.
27
Id.
20

500

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:493

standard terms could be used without rendering them invalid.28 Moreover,
the court found that both parties were sizable business entities, who had
arrived at contract terms after months of negotiations.29 As another court
found in rejecting unconscionability defenses, “the buyer was hardly the
sheep keeping company with wolves that it would have us believe.”30
Thus, it appears that an argument against limitations of liability based
directly on unconscionability will most likely be dead on arrival, absent
unique circumstances. An indirect approach to avoiding consequential damages disclaimers has been derived from the section 2-719 language dealing
with failure of essential purpose.31
II. STRIKING DISCLAIMERS BASED ON FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSE
Although the UCC generally allows limited remedies, exclusivity may not
apply to the extent that “circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose.”32 Courts construe this language to operate when
either party has been deprived of the substantial value of its bargain.33 The most
common scenarios involve a seller’s inability or unwillingness to effect warranty repairs within a reasonable time.34 The seller’s negligence or bad faith is not
considered relevant to this aspect of the issue.35
Case law reflects greater discord on the further question of whether a
finding of “failure of essential purpose” also negates the consequential
damages disclaimer.36 In simple terms, buyers argue that a failure of essential purpose entitles them to all Article 2 remedies, one of which is consequential damages.37 The counterargument is that these provisions are

28

Id.
Id.
30
K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 263 A.2d 390, 393 (Pa. 1970).
31
U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012).
32
Id.
33
See, e.g., Transp. Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 959 (8th
Cir. 1994); see also Eddy, supra note 23, at 38; John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability:
Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 46 (1969). See generally Roy Ryden Anderson,
Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failure on Purpose: A Look at Section 2-719 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 SW. L.J. 759, 766 (1977).
34
See Transp. Corp. of Am., 30 F.3d at 959; Eddy, supra note 23, at 29; Murray,
supra note 33, at 51; Anderson, supra note 33, at 768; Beal v. Gen. Motors Corp., 354 F.
Supp. 423, 425 (D. Del. 1973).
35
See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1085 (3d Cir. 1980);
S. M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1374–75 (9th Cir. 1978).
36
See Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1314 (9th Cir. 1984).
37
See id. at 1315; Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1977).
29
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independent and should be construed separately.38 A third approach relies
on a case-by-case assessment.39
One commentator recently conducted an extensive analysis of the UCC
language and case law.40 He suggests that “[c]onsequential damages should
be available when a limited or exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose
(1) only if the parties have not waived them for breach of warranty and/or
breach of contract and (2) only as of the date the essential purpose of the limited remedy fails.”41 This proposal clearly merits consideration because it
would provide a potential means for reconciling the disparate approaches
while promoting freedom of contract. It appears that no court has yet adopted
this approach.42 Pending such a development, results will vary depending on
the jurisdiction and factual setting, with much of the case law arising in the
federal courts.43
This Article posits that courts that view sections 2-719(2) and (3) independently proffer the best analysis consistent with freedom of contract.
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
The limited remedy of repair and a consequential damages exclusion are
two discrete ways of attempting to limit recovery for breach of warranty....
The Code, moreover, tests each by a different standard. The former
survives unless it fails of its essential purpose, while the latter is valid
unless it is unconscionable.... We therefore see no reason to hold, as a
general proposition, that the failure of the limited remedy provided in the
contract, without more, invalidates a wholly distinct term in the agreement
excluding consequential damages. The two are not mutually exclusive.44

The court then analyzed the circumstances surrounding the discrete provisions and concluded that there was nothing unconscionable about enforcing the parties’ agreed risk allocation disclaiming consequential damages.45
Unfortunately, the court left an opening during its analysis by stating that
38

See Chatlos Sys., 635 F.2d at 1086.
See Cole Energy Dev. Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 678 F. Supp. 208, 211 (C.D. Ill. 1988).
40
See Robert J. Williams, Getting What You Bargained For: How Courts Might Provide
a Coherent Basis for Damages That Arise When Remedies Fail of Their Essential Purpose,
5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 131, 134 (2010).
41
Id. at 136.
42
Research has disclosed no cases citing Williams’ article.
43
See Williams, supra note 40, at 135. One explanation for the preponderance of federal
court decisions might be that commercial litigators prefer federal courts over state courts.
Cases originally commenced in state courts can of course be removed to a cognizant federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. (2012).
44
Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980).
45
See id. at 1087.
39
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it was “not a case where the seller acted unreasonably or in bad faith.”46
Some later courts have seized upon this language and suggested that a bad
faith exception may apply.47 If so, this would effectively require the caseby-case approach adopted by some courts as mentioned above. Other
courts have dismissed this contention on the basis that the question of
“good faith” or “bad faith” constitutes an entirely separate question under
the UCC.48 Therefore, the uncertain role that “bad faith” may play further
clouds the enforceability of consequential damages disclaimers.
The conclusion that a consequential damages disclaimer may survive a
“failure of essential purpose” does not necessarily extend to other liability
limitations. Section 2-719(3) only mentions consequential damages.49 In a
typical situation, such as our initial scenario, a seller undertakes warranty
repairs at its cost. A seller may incur repair costs, which would probably be
considered “direct” rather than consequential in nature.50 If a court finds
that a warranty has failed of its essential purpose, a seller may not be able to
invoke its “cap” on liability for such direct costs and could therefore have
unlimited liability to effect repairs.51 In short, the second part of the sample
limitation above would not be enforced.
This resolution—allowing a buyer unlimited repair costs but no lost
profits or other consequential damages—may not fully compensate a buyer,
especially one whose product is never fixed. However, in situations entailing significant technical, technological, or commercial risks, the parties
remain free to tailor their contracts to the situation.52 A seller spending inordinate sums effecting repairs will have ample incentives to make accommodations. In some circumstances, a seller must also recognize that
public policy may still limit its limitations.
III. THE “PUBLIC POLICY” EXCEPTION FOR LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY
The common law refuses to enforce exculpatory clauses in contracts in
which enforcement would violate public policy.53 As expressed by the
46

Id.
See Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 187 n.6 (Mass. 1990).
48
See Bray Int’l, Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. CIV H-02-0098, 2005 WL
3371875, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
49
See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012).
50
See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435,
459–60 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
51
See id.
52
See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1087 (3d
Cir. 1980).
53
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1979).
47
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New York Court of Appeals, “an exculpatory agreement, no matter how
flat and unqualified its terms, will not exonerate a party from liability under all circumstances. Under announced public policy, it will not apply to
exemption of willful or grossly negligent acts.”54 Other courts have added
an additional, related exception for contracts that are intrinsically tied to
the public interest.55 This “public policy” concept has been extended to
contracts containing limitations of liability for a breach or other fault, as
opposed to exempting or exculpating another party from any liability.56
Courts have struggled with the public policy exception in several
ways. As one court aptly summarized the fundamental tension, “[f]earing
the disruptive effect that invocation of the highly elusive public policy principle would likely exert on the stability of commercial and contractual relations, Maryland courts have been hesitant to strike down voluntary bargains
on public policy grounds.”57 Further, courts sometimes confuse precedents
discussing exculpatory clauses with those addressing liability limitations.
This is evidenced in part by cases citing section 195 of the Restatement of
Contracts that addresses only exemptions from liability, which in reality
equate to exculpatory clauses.58 Some courts fortunately recognize the distinction. “[W]hereas exculpatory clauses are generally disfavored by courts
and subject to strict construction standards, limitation of liability clauses are
not disfavored and are construed under the general rules applying to contract interpretation.”59
As always, context matters. Much of the case law on exculpatory clauses developed outside the commercial sphere. In some consumer contexts,
one cannot legally achieve complete exoneration, even for ordinary negligence.60 It is relatively easier to understand a broad reluctance with pure
exculpatory clauses, than any hesitation associated with limitations on remedies. Exculpatory clauses seek to shield a company from any liability.61
54

Kalisch-Jarcho v. City of New York, 448 N.E.2d 413, 416 (N.Y. 1983).
See Md. Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Wash. Nat’l Arena, 386 A.2d
1216, 1229 (Md. 1978); Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 525 (Md. 1994).
56
See Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1370–71 (N.Y. 1992).
57
Md. Nat’l Capital Park, 386 A.2d at 1228.
58
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195.
59
Royal Indem. Co. v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (E.D. Pa. 2003); see
also Great N. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 723, 752 n.29 (W.D. Pa.
2007). Many of the decisions involving interpretations of limitation of liability provisions
use the term “exculpatory” when referring to limitation of liability clauses. As noted above,
this is a distinction with a very real difference, and has resulted in confusion and inconsistent results in the state appellate and federal district courts.
60
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. a.
61
See, e.g., Roopchan v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 2d 636, 642 (E.D. Tenn.
2011); Platt v. Gateway Int’l Motorsports Corp., 813 N.E.2d 279, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
55
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Limitations of liability, on the other hand, seek to do precisely what the
term suggests: limit rather than exempt a company from liability.62 Many
commercial contracts contain interrelated provisions concerning warranty
limitations and exclusive remedies, in addition to liability limitations.63 Although one may contend that the net collective effect of these provisions accomplishes much the same thing as an exculpatory clause, the two concepts
cannot be considered equal.64
When analyzing limitations of liability between sophisticated parties,
courts focus on the conscious risk allocations.65 Much of the case law developed from disputes in industries such as energy and power generation, computer systems, and building alarm systems.66 One may often find a discernible,
if not universally accepted, industry practice underpinning the express terms.67
The UCC clearly allows limitations on the quantum of remedies, provided “that at least minimum adequate remedies [remain] available.”68 Neither
section 2-719(3) nor its associated comments mention public policy as a further constraint on consequential damages disclaimers.69 Buyers, moreover,
retain the right to claim non-consequential damages up to the limit contained
in the contract.70 Such damages may not satisfy a buyer that sustains significant economic harm. In response, buyers and their counsel have accordingly
devised other theories to overcome contractual limitations, primarily by asserting tort claims.71
62

See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 13-11, at 708.
See id.
64
Great N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
65
For example, in Canal Electric, the court found that consequential damages disclaimers
such as that used by Westinghouse constituted a norm in the power generation industry and
represented “a reasonable accommodation between two commercially sophisticated parties.”
Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 548 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Mass. 1990).
66
With respect to the power generation industry, see Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 844 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1988); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 1281 (D.N.H. 1981); Am. Elec. Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Canal Elec., 548 N.E.2d at
182; N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989). With respect to alarm systems, see Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rest Assured Alarm Sys.,
Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 798, 798, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Great N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at
723, 729, 735; Synnex Corp. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 928 A.2d 37, 45 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2007). See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Validity, Construction, and Application
of Exculpatory and Limitation of Liability Clauses in Burglary, Fire, and Other Home and
Business Monitoring Service Contracts, 36 A.L.R. 6TH 305 (2008).
67
See Southland Farms, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 575 So. 2d 1077, 1077–79 (Ala.
1991); Canal Elec., 548 N.E.2d at 185–86.
68
U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012).
69
See id. § 2-719(3).
70
See, e.g., Canal Elec., 548 N.E.2d at 186.
71
See cases cited in supra note 66. In virtually all of these cases, tort claims were asserted.
63
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IV. RESTRICTING ECONOMIC LOSS IN TORT
Against the backdrop of evolving products liability law nationwide, particularly strict liability under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, courts confronted commercial claims arising out of contracts yet
sounding in tort.72 Two watershed cases, the early California Supreme Court
case of Seely v. White Motor Co.,73 and the United States Supreme Court
case East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,74 addressed
this duality and restricted contracting parties’ capabilities of asserting claims
for economic losses in tort.75
Seely involved a rather straightforward claim for damages for repair costs,
purchase price payments, and lost profits stemming from an accident involving a truck used for plaintiff’s business.76 The court upheld the trial court’s
ruling that the defendant manufacturer was liable for all but the repair costs
based on a breach of express warranty.77 The court declined to disturb the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff had not proven that the product defect
caused the physical damage.78 More importantly, in arguable dicta, the court
refused to apply strict liability, rather than UCC warranty law, to the plaintiff’s claims, eloquently stating:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical
injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does
not rest on the ‘luck’ of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical
injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products.
He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects
by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of
conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the
level of performance of his products in the consumer’s business unless he
agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer’s demands. A
consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He
can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match
his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will.79

72

See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 147–48 (Cal. 1965); East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 859 (1986).
73
See Seely, 403 P.2d 145.
74
See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. 858.
75
See id. at 868–69; Seely, 403 P.2d at 151.
76
See Seely, 403 P.2d at 147–49.
77
See id. at 152.
78
See id.
79
Id. at 151.
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In East River Steamship, the United States Supreme Court applied
what it termed the “majority land-based approach” represented by Seely to
an admiralty claim for damage to a ship’s turbine.80 The Supreme Court
held “that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under
either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product
from injuring itself.”81 The Court rationalized that “[t]he increased cost to
the public that would result from holding a manufacturer liable in tort ... is
not justified.”82 East River Steamship strongly influenced subsequent decisions and solidified the use of the “economic loss” rule, with some variations among jurisdictions, to stem the tide of parties pursuing tort claims
for economic losses, at least absent personal injury or property damage.83
The trend is well represented by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision
in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.84:
We agree and find no reason to intrude into the parties’ allocation of
risk by imposing a tort duty and corresponding cost burden on the public. We hold contract principles more appropriate than tort principles
for resolving economic loss without an accompanying physical injury
or property damage. The lack of a tort remedy does not mean that the
purchaser is unable to protect himself from loss. We note the Uniform
Commercial Code contains statutory remedies for dealing with economic losses under warranty law, which, to a large extent, would have
limited application if we adopted the minority view. Further, the purchaser, particularly in a large commercial transaction like the instant
case, can protect his interests by negotiation and contractual bargaining
or insurance. The purchaser has the choice to forego warranty protection in order to obtain a lower price. We conclude that we should refrain
from injecting the judiciary into this type of economic decision-making.85

The “economic loss” rule acts as a trade-off in products liability claims. In
exchange for the somewhat easier tort route afforded by strict liability and
80

See East River S.S. Corp. 476 U.S. at 868, 870.
Id. at 871.
82
Id.
83
See, e.g., Jones v. Childers & Talent Servs., Inc., 18 F.3d 899, 904 (11th Cir. 1994);
Purvis v. Consol. Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 220 (4th Cir. 1982); Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1980); Fla. Power
& Light v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 900, 902 (Fla. 1987); Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 446 (Ill. 1982); Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc.,
486 N.W.2d 612, 624–25 (Mich. 1992). For an excellent overall discussion of the
“economic loss” doctrine, see Ralph A. Anzivino, The False Dilemma of the Economic Loss
Doctrine, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1121 (2010).
84
Fla. Power & Light, 510 So. 2d at 901–02.
85
Id. at 902. In Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., No. SC10-1022, 2013
WL 828003 (March 7, 2013), the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida’s economic loss
rule applied only in the products liability context.
81
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negligence for personal injuries and property damage, claimants with purely
economic losses are relegated to warranty and other contract claims.86
Courts have since wrestled with the types of tort claims barred from assertion in contract. Coverage for simple negligence is clear, at least absent
property damage or “a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury.”87 Other cases have found that misrepresentations, even if characterized as fraudulent, fall within the ambit of the “economic loss” rule at
least insofar as they simply re-cast basic contract claims as opposed to alleging fraud in the inducement.88 The outcome may hinge on whether or not
the allegations amount to a separate and distinct tort.89 Using the approach
most courts follow, if intentional torts are covered, this Article maintains
that ipso facto gross negligence claims should also be swept under the “economic loss” umbrella.
One commentator proposed adopting a “contract-first” approach to resolving conflicting tort and contract claims for economic loss, especially the
“other property” exception.90 This would arguably enhance the economic
loss rule’s cardinal principles: “(1) to maintain the fundamental distinction
between tort law and contract law; (2) to protect commercial parties’ freedom to allocate economic risk by contract; and (3) to encourage the party
best situated to assess the risk [of] economic loss, the commercial [buyer],
to assume, allocate, or insure against that risk.”91
Clearly, both these principles and the proposed solution appear laudable
and fully consistent with UCC tenets.92 The commentator enumerates the
safeguards justifying this approach.93 These otherwise viable safeguards
include ongoing protection against a seller’s gross negligence.94 In contrast,
this Article posits that gross negligence should not prevent enforceability of
a consequential damages disclaimer.
86

See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 871–76.
Potomac Constructors v. EFCO Corp., 530 F. Supp. 2d 731, 737 (D. Md. 2008)
(quoting Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.,
517 A.2d 336, 345 (Md. 1986)); see also cases cited supra note 37.
88
See Imaging Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Lettergraphics/Detroit, Inc., 178 F.3d 1294, at *2
(6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Allmand Assocs., Inc. v. Hercules Inc., 960
F. Supp. 1216, 1216 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
89
See Action Orthopedics, Inc. v. Techmedica, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 (M.D.
Fla. 1991).
90
See Anzivino, supra note 83, at 1128–30.
91
Id. at 1142 (quoting Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842,
846 (Wis. 1998)).
92
See id. at 1133.
93
See id. at 1133–42.
94
See id. at 1141–42. The article does not elaborate on the essential difference between
exculpatory clauses and disclaimers or attempt to reconcile this view with the language of
the UCC.
87
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V. GROSS NEGLIGENCE AS A LIABILITY STANDARD
Gross negligence was originally conceived as involving either a great
amount of negligence or a lack of even slight care.95 The term may simply be
described as “very careless.”96 According to one commentator, some courts
have construed gross negligence as requiring willful, wanton, or reckless
misconduct, or such utter lack of all care as will be evidence thereof ....
But it is still true that most courts consider that “gross negligence” falls
short of a reckless disregard of the consequences, and differs from
ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.97

Indeed, many formulations equate gross negligence with some form of recklessness or conscious disregard.98 Under North Carolina law for example, gross
negligence “has the same basic elements as negligence, but requires either ‘intentional wrongdoing or deliberate misconduct affecting the safety of others,’
such as ‘when the act is done purposely and with knowledge that such act is a
breach of duty to others.’”99 Under Massachusetts law, gross negligence “falls
short of being equivalent to a willful and intentional wrong.”100 Louisiana’s
related concept of “gross fault” has been equated with fraud.101
The United States Supreme Court discussed various liability standards for
upholding punitive damages in a section 1983 action based on a showing of
reckless disregard or indifference to a claimant’s federally protected rights.102
The Court noted the historical variation among the states in determining the
proper liability standard for punitive damages, “exacerbated by the ambiguity
and slipperiness of such common terms as ‘malice’ and ‘gross negligence.’”103 The Court reviewed the standard articulated in prior cases since
95

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at
211 (5th ed. 1984).
96
See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 61, 73 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97
KEETON ET AL., supra note 95, § 34, at 212.
98
See, e.g., Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 723 A.2d 454, 462 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1998); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504,
506, 508 (N.Y. 1994).
99
Boykin Anchor Co. v. AT&T Corp., 825 F. Supp. 2d 706, 712 n.6 (E.D.N.C. 2011).
100
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Grinnell Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 327, 334 (D. Mass.
2007) (citing Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 591–92 (1919)).
101
See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., 84 F.3d 172, 177 (5th
Cir. 1996). Here the court found limitations of liability in a warranty clause invalid under
a Louisiana statute and relied in large measure on a law review article that provided much
of the basis for drafting the statute. See Saul Litvinoff, Stipulations as to Liability and as
to Damages, 52 TUL. L. REV. 258, 279 (1978).
102
See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 33 (1983).
103
Id. at 39.
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those cases conflicted as to whether the vague term “gross negligence” could
serve as the basis for punitive damages.104 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s strong dissenting opinion urged a requirement of “wrongful intent” to resolve the conflict; gross negligence, however defined, set too amorphous a standard for
courts to apply.105
To resolve concerns such as those of Chief Justice Rehnquist, a few
states have enacted statutory definitions. Texas law requires both an extreme degree of risk and an actual, subjective awareness by the actor.106
Michigan applies a simpler formulation to support governmental tort immunity: “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern
for whether an injury results.”107 Oklahoma’s statutory scheme provides a
general definition for gross negligence: that it “consists ... in the want of
slight care and diligence.”108
The Oklahoma Supreme Court cited and quoted the Oklahoma statute in
a case involving allegations of gross negligence, elaborating that
[t]he intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard
of the consequences or in callous indifference to the life, liberty or
property of another, may result in such a gross want of care for the
rights of others and of the public that the finding of a willful, wanton,
deliberate act is justified.109

A subsequent federal court decision characterized this statement as an “expounding” of the definition, concluding, “gross negligence is the same as

104

See id.
See id. at 57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West 2003). This statute provides
in pertinent part:
(11) “Gross negligence” means an act or omission:
(A) which when viewed objectively from the standpoint of the
actor at the time of its occurrence involves an extreme degree of
risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential
harm to others; and
(B) of which the actor has actual, subjective awareness of the risk
involved, but nevertheless proceeds with conscious indifference
to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.
Id.
107
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407 (2012). This statute provides in pertinent part:
(7) As used in this section:
(a)“Gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate
a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.
Id.
108
OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 6 (2012).
109
Fox v. Okla. Mem’l Hosp., 774 P.2d 459, 461 (Okla. 1989).
105
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[an ordinary] negligence claim, differing only as to the degree.”110 Although
the latter phrase certainly meshes with the statutory definition, the language
in these cases blurs the distinction between negligent acts and intentional,
deliberate, or willful actions, contrary to fundamental tort precepts.
Two Oklahoma cases involving oil well locations illustrate how courts
apply Oklahoma law to alleged gross negligence actions.111 In one case, the
court found that drilling a well within defined boundaries without notifying
the other party did not constitute gross negligence although such action
could constitute ordinary negligence.112 The court distinguished a prior case
where a driller relocated a well staked at a specific location without giving
notice and later attempted to hide its actions.113 The later court differentiated between apparent inadvertence and a seemingly intentional act.114
Although gross negligence can serve as a basis for tort liability, its status as a separate cause of action varies among the states.115 In some instances, the concept of “gross negligence” has been abandoned in connection with adoption of a comparative negligence scheme.116 A majority of
states have passed comparative negligence statutes, potentially obviating
the need for a separately available gross negligence claim.117
Many cases involving gross negligence involve alarm systems. Plaintiffs
often allege gross negligence in order to overcome a contractual limitation of
liability excluding gross negligence.118 New York courts articulated a more
stringent standard in the limitation of liability context, where “[g]ross negligence ... is defined as conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for the rights
of others or smacks of intentional wrongdoing. To constitute gross negligence, the act or omission must be of an aggravated character, as distinguished from the failure to exercise ordinary care.”119 Under this heightened
standard, allegations such as inappropriate installation, inspection failures,
and inadequate responses represent nothing more than ordinary negligence.120
110

NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1546 (N.D. Okla. 1997).
See Palace Exploration Co. v. Petroleum Dev. Co., 374 F.3d 951, 951 (10th Cir.
2004); Hamilton v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 316 (Tex. App. 1982).
112
See Palace Exploration, 374 F.3d at 954.
113
See Hamilton, 648 S.W.2d at 323–24.
114
See Palace Exploration, 374 F.3d at 954–55.
115
See, e.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 747–48 (Conn. 2005).
116
See, e.g., Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 2009).
117
See, e.g., id.; Hanks, 885 A.2d at 747–48.
118
See Shields, supra note 66, § 2.
119
Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rest Assured Alarm Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 798, 807
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Losco Grp., Inc., 204 F. Supp.
2d 639, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal quotations & citations omitted)).
120
See id. at 807–08.
111
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Application of the heightened standard sometimes results in summary
judgment based on the limitation of liability clause.121 Where the plaintiff
claimed that a burglar alarm company’s failure to wire a skylight properly
constituted gross negligence, the New York court upheld summary judgment, indicating that such failure, “while perhaps suggestive of negligence
or even ‘gross negligence’ as used elsewhere, does not evince the recklessness necessary to abrogate [an] agreement to absolve [the alarm company]
from negligence claims.”122 Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a broad limitation of liability that excluded gross negligence.123 The
court concluded that the defendant’s actions were motivated by economic
self-interest, which was insufficient to support the reckless disregard
“smack[ing] of intentional wrongdoing” standard necessary to vitiate the
limitation of liability.124 In other words, facts that might otherwise warrant a
finding of “gross negligence” will not suffice to overturn a negotiated limitation of liability. This stricter standard has not been consistently applied,
however, even in New York.125
Suffice it to say, based on the examples provided above, there is no
clearly established definition of “gross negligence.” Court cases do not
even suggest “you know it when you see it” in all situations.126 Whether
particular conduct supports a finding of gross negligence is normally a
question of fact.127 Leaving a decision as to the enforceability of such a
provision as critical as consequential damages disclaimers to case-by-case
analysis hardly creates the level of certainty sought by contracting parties.

121

See, e.g., id. at 808.
Colnaghi, U.S.A., Ltd. v. Jewelers Prot. Servs., Ltd., 611 N.E.2d 282, 284 (N.Y. 1993).
123
See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504, 505–06
(N.Y. 1994).
124
See id. at 509.
125
See Net2Globe Int’l, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom of N.Y., 273 F. Supp. 2d 436,
450 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d at 509; cf. Apache Bohai Corp. v.
Texaco China BV, 480 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2007); Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593
N.E.2d 1365, 1370–71 (N.Y. 1992). The Apache Bohai court upheld an arbitration award
where the “arbitrator found that clause unenforceable as against public policy because
Apache (1) acted with reckless disregard for Texaco’s rights; (2) intentionally abandoned
the contract; and (3) breached a fundamental obligation of the contract.” 480 F.3d at 406.
The key to this case may have been the limited review of an arbitrator’s decision confirmed
by a district court.
126
Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice
Stewart declined to define the limits of hardcore pornography, famously saying “I know
it when I see it.” Id.
127
See Net2Globe, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
122

512

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:493

VI. TOWARD FREEDOM OF CONTRACT,
CONSISTENCY, AND A BRIGHTER LINE
Undoubtedly, freedom of contract represents a vital underpinning of
both our legal and commercial systems.128 Consequential damages can easily reach millions of dollars.129 A plant or business that suffers significant
downtime, business interruption, or lost profits, especially over an extended
period of time, can often justifiably claim exorbitant amounts.130 A seller
may reasonably foresee this quantum of damages, but most sellers are not
likely positioned to absorb them.131 Therefore, consequential damages limitations clearly form a material part of a company’s risk analysis. Should a
company be able to rely on the negotiated waiver language unless it has intentionally caused the complained harm? This Article argues that it should,
for the reasons that follow.
Based on an examination of section 2-719’s text, one would not be inclined to surmise that gross negligence, or even intentional acts, should defeat a properly negotiated limitation of liability. The section plainly states,
“[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
or exclusion is unconscionable.”132 Comment 3 buttresses the conclusion
that unconscionability constitutes the only statutory test, since “such terms
are merely an allocation of unknown or undeterminable risks.”133 As established earlier in this Article, unconscionability findings remain “rare” in
the commercial setting, and such claims should be subjected to a “hardheaded analysis.”134
128

The United States Supreme Court has underscored this principle’s importance by
suggesting that the due process clause retains vitality to protect contract rights. See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting
Allgeyer v. Lousiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1972); see also Steven W. Feldman, Autonomy and Accountability
in the Law of Contracts: A Response to Professor Shiffrin, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 222
n.220 (2009).
129
See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919, 922–23 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (the plaintiff alleging that losses from a generator forced to be off-line for
over three months caused damages in excess of eight million dollars).
130
See id.
131
See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504, 508 (N.Y.
1994) (noting that the seller “would be under inordinate economic pressure to complete
performance, being at risk of incurring liability for consequential damages in sums ... many
times greater than the gross contract price” without a clause limiting liability).
132
U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2012); see Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d
751, 756–57 (3d Cir. 1976).
133
U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 3.
134
WHITE & SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 13-11, at 710.
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Various cases support such a strict textual reading, by adopting an “independent approach” when evaluating “failure of essential purpose.”135 The
courts reason that warranty repair remedies and consequential damage
waivers represent discrete means of handling risks, as measured by different
standards.136 In other words, the consequential damages waiver stands on its
own merits for evaluations based on unconscionability.137 No equivalent
standard exists for caps. Because commercial disputes typically involve performance or warranty issues, it may make sense that a company must spend
amounts over the cap in order to make a product work.
What then provides the basis for courts to overturn consequential damages disclaimers based on public policy? One answer stems from the UCC’s
preservation of supplemental principles of law, including contract law, “[u]nless displaced by the particular provision[s].”138 Nevertheless, some courts
have explicitly or implicitly found that section 2-719 displaces the common
law regarding the enforceability of limitation of liability clauses.139 If so,
courts should not maintain a “public policy” exception to enforceability,
which is unsupported by the UCC language, especially insofar as such a policy fails to distinguish between exculpatory clauses and liability limitations.
Several cases applying Pennsylvania law support the analyses recommended in this Article.140 The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld consequential damages limitations in New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. (NYSEG).141 In NYSEG, the plaintiff sought to
recover lost profits and replacement power costs on various theories, including negligence, allegedly caused by a defective Westinghouse turbine generator.142 The court upheld the trial court’s ruling that the claims for these
consequential damages were barred due to the express contractual limitation
of liability as well as the economic loss rule.143 The court provided a simple
135

Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980);
see also Williams, supra note 40, at 135.
136
See Chatlos Sys., 635 F.2d at 1086; see also Williams, supra note 40, at 135.
137
See Chatlos Sys., 635 F.2d at 1086.
138
U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2012). As the comments discuss, this section was amended to
clear up some confusion concerning the relationship between the UCC and the common
law of contracts.
139
See McNally Wellman Co. v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1196 (2d
Cir. 1995); N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919, 929
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
140
See, e.g., Great N. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 723, 753 (W.D.
Pa. 2007); Valeo v. Pocono Int’l Raceway, Inc., 500 A.2d 492, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
141
N.Y. State Elec., 564 A.2d at 920, 930.
142
See id. at 923.
143
See id. at 926.
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and straightforward analysis: “[T]he parties specifically allocated the risks
of uncertain events and consequences, including the risk that the generator
would be out of service for some time, by agreeing to a limitation on Westinghouse’s liability.”144
Courts have also expressly confronted the significant difference between
exculpatory clauses and liability limitations.145 Rejecting a buyer’s attempt
to impose strict scrutiny, an appellate court was
persuaded that limitation of liability clauses are not disfavored under
Pennsylvania law; especially when contained in contracts between informed
business entities dealing at arm’s length, and there has been no injury to
person or property. Furthermore, such clauses are not subjected to the same
stringent standards applied to exculpatory and indemnity clauses.146

As the subsequent federal case Great Northern Insurance Co. v. ADT Security Services, Inc.147 confirmed, Pennsylvania courts evaluate each limitation of
liability based on a three part test to determine whether the clause: “(1) does
not violate public policy; (2) is part of a contract between private parties and
relates solely to their private affairs; and (3) is not a contract of adhesion.”148
Great Northern engaged in the well-reasoned analysis advocated by
this author, albeit under the common law rather than the UCC.149 After
finding the limitation of liability generally enforceable, it addressed the
plaintiff’s contention that the clause’s limitation—restricting the plaintiff
to $1000—should not apply to situations involving gross negligence.150
The court distinguished various precedents either dealing with exculpatory
clauses or analyzing limitations of liability as exculpatory clauses.151 The
court concluded that Pennsylvania courts would uphold liability limitations
in the face of alleged gross negligence, and found as a matter of law that
the limitation applied.152
The contract language in Great Northern limited liability for “negligence, active or otherwise.”153 The court found this language sufficiently
144

Id. at 925.
See, e.g., Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assoc., 44 F.3d 195, 204 (3d Cir. 1995); Great
N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
146
Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 203–04.
147
Great N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
148
Id. at 747 (citing Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Bus. Men’s Ass’n,
224 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. 1966)).
149
See id. at 749.
150
See id. at 751.
151
See id. at 753.
152
Great N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
153
Id. at 751.
145
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broad and clear as to encompass gross negligence.154 By so doing, the court
relied in part on a Pennsylvania appellate court decision upholding a true exculpatory clause disclaiming liability for “negligence or otherwise” as covering gross negligence.155 Pennsylvania, like many jurisdictions, has somewhat
confusing precedents concerning the impact of degrees of negligence.156
Cases from other jurisdictions reach disparate results, often in the guise
of evaluating, or relying on precedents involving, actual or supposed exculpatory clauses.157 These cases perpetuate the use of gross negligence, as
well as intentional wrongdoing, or lesser standards such as recklessness, as
a means of overcoming limitations of liability.158 As Justice Rehnquist
summarized the common law, “‘gross negligence’ is ‘a relative term,’ and
‘a word of description, and not of definition.’”159 “This distinction between
acts that are intentionally harmful and those that are very negligent, or unreasonable, involves a basic difference of kind, not just a variation of degree.”160 The bottom line is that the term imparts too uncertain a standard
for judging something as important as contractual limitations of liability.
Gross negligence exclusions also undercut the “economic loss in tort”
theory. Consequential damages represent a quintessential example of economic or commercial losses.161 If consequential damages cannot be disclaimed for gross negligence, then logic suggests that such tort claims for
“economic losses” would presumably be permitted. Thus, one cannot reconcile adoption of the economic loss in tort principle with maintenance of
gross negligence as an exception. At least one court has indeed barred tort
claims founded on gross negligence because there were no duties outside
of the written agreement.162
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“Public policy” exceptions should be limited to intentional wrongdoing
rather than any degree of negligence, this Article suggests. New York courts
embrace, even if they do not always employ, the “smack[ing] of intentional
wrongdoing” standard.163 Commentators analyzing consequential damages
suggest that it is “important to limit expansive liability to those [intentional
and willful] breaches that are most readily capable of being deterred.”164
A potential contractual standard to exclude or except limitations of liability may be framed, as in the wording at the beginning of this Article, as
“willful misconduct.”165 Although used in a wide variety of statutes and
conventions, this phrase may not be susceptible to a single precise meaning.166 Indeed, the use of “willfulness” as a standard applied to breach of
contract actions has been criticized by a prominent contracts scholar as indicating “a childlike faith in the existence of a plain and obvious line between
the good and the bad, between unfortunate virtue and unforgivable sin.”167
The term “willful” when coupled with “misconduct” certainly connotes actual or equivalent knowledge, combined with a repugnant intent or action.168
The term appears to bear close similarity to “reckless disregard” in some
contexts, but should still require a degree of awareness almost akin to scienter requirements under criminal law.169 In any case, the term should impart
conduct greater than gross negligence.170 Flaunting of a legal duty could
suffice, for example.171 Although companies may not be able to control
their employees’ intentional acts any more than they can control grossly
negligent actions, contracting parties can more adequately gauge those acts
that represent intentional or willful conduct versus acts that fall below the
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Diamond & Foss, supra note 17, at 681.
165
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164

2013] CLASHING POLICIES OR CONFUSING PRECEDENTS

517

standard.172 To the extent sellers’ contracts so provide, the sellers should
take responsibility for corporate acts such as a conscious management decision to take or forego certain critical remedial actions or withhold essential
information. For example, suppose a company learns that its products contain a latent defect with a high probability of product failure, which as a result would cause serious economic harm to a prospective plaintiff.173 The
company makes an informed decision not to notify a customer of the defect
due to its remedial costs. Several months later, the product indeed malfunctions and explodes, causing a fire at the customer’s factory and millions of
dollars of property damage. Such a conscious decision may “smack of intentional wrongdoing” and justify holding the company liable for consequential damages, if the contract allows such liability.
Contrast the above scenario with a situation where a fully trained employee performs work on a buyer’s product. The employee fails to follow
industry standards or simply takes a short cut, causing the type of explosion
and damages described above. How can a company or a court determine
whether such actions amount to ordinary versus gross negligence? Under
what circumstances should a company be held liable? The concern with uncertainty is compounded since the existence of gross negligence is normally
considered a question of fact.174
Accepting the proposition that contract language should be enforced,
courts must still ascertain the parties’ intent to determine what conduct has
been excluded.175 Certainly, courts must determine that the contract language is written so as to cover gross negligence, as in Great Northern.176
An exclusion of “negligence” should suffice, without the need to distinguish
gross negligence, as at least some courts have held.177 The sample language at
the beginning of this Article therefore works, inasmuch as it shows a clear
intent to exclude or limit claims on any legal theory other than contract.
172
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If the parties wish to retain the right to unlimited liability or a lesser
standard, such as for gross negligence, that right can be incorporated into
the contract.178 Indeed, many contract provisions do incorporate such language.179 There must also remain room for finding unconscionability in
those rare instances where the circumstances warrant it. Otherwise, courts
should not disturb a conscious risk allocation using the vagary of gross
negligence, especially for a provision having as much impact as a consequential damages disclaimer.
In viewing conscious allocations of risk, several factors lurk in the
background, including risk mitigation and the contracting parties’ relationships. Companies typically obtain insurance to protect themselves from major contractual or project risks.180 Parties take on insurance costs and burdens based in part on their ability to control the underlying risks, and in part
on their rights or property interests in the damaged property.181 Insurance
never provides a complete solution, since coverage may not be clear, premiums may increase to reflect payouts, and insurance companies may pursue subrogation claims against the other contracting party based on fault.182
The extent of the parties’ relationship also matters. Course of performance, course of dealing, and trade usage must be considered.183 Often these circumstances arise between companies who have conducted business in
the past. How the companies have handled issues may help determine their
respective intentions and influence contract interpretation. Even more likely, standards develop in particular industries or trades.184 In the power generation industry, for example, it has long been common for companies to
limit their liability, often in relation to the purchase price for the particular
contract, and to disclaim consequential, indirect, and similar damages.185
Willful misconduct is often excluded from such limitations, while gross
negligence less often appears as an express exception or exclusion.186
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CONCLUSION
Returning to the scenario raised in the introduction, a seller’s status under current law must be characterized as uncertain, even though the parties’
intent seems clear enough. The law should follow the analyses employed by
the NYSEG and Great Northern courts. Where commercial parties have negotiated contractual terms, and agreed to disclaim consequential damages,
their bargain should be upheld. The only exceptions that should potentially
be countenanced are:
1. Willful misconduct or similar intentional actions;
2. Those rare instances where unconscionability truly applies; and
3. Any other exceptions or exclusions expressly agreed to by
the parties.
In all of these cases, interpretations should be made based on the parties’ contract, and as a matter of law. If the contract language leaves doubt
as to the intentions of the parties, that matter may require a threshold resolution. Where the language is clear, or the parties’ intentions may be readily
discerned, courts should not disturb the deal.

